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Deforestation in the North western part of Pakistan is a long standing problem. The 
Forestry Department, as formal managers of the forest resources, has been undergoing a 
long reform process aimed at improving its performance. This reform process has not 
resulted in less deforestation. From the policy perspective this has been leading to stated 
intentions to further reform the Forestry Department, the question is whether 
organizational reform is the answer. We think there are more limiting bottlenecks to 
sustainable forest management in Pakistan. De facto property rights are not as simple as 
denoted by statutory law. In this article we explore the mechanisms behind the 
deforestation and try to uncover mechanisms to reverse the process. Although our 
conclusions are not very optimistic, we provide a framework for determining the 
bottlenecks in the management of common resources from the perspective of 
institutions. We show that in circumstances where institutional change is necessary we 
are faced with a trade-off between the transaction costs related to the enforcement of 
“improved” institutional arrangements and the transaction costs improving enforceable 
institutional arrangements. Incurring these transaction costs only makes sense if the 
benefits from improved institutional arrangements outweigh them and the transition 
costs. When we relate this dilemma to the management regime of the forest in North 
west Pakistan, we identify at the one end of the spectrum the ideal forest management 
system; at the other end we see the spontaneous evolution of self organization. The 
current situation is an intermediate form with an incoherent set of external interventions 
and strategic reactions by different agents in the local communities. The emergent 
system of management is the one producing the present dismal outcome.  
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1.  Introduction 
Deforestation in the North western part of Pakistan is a long standing problem. Forest 
cover was 5% in 1996 compared to 20-25% in 1850 (Sungi, 1996). In the district of Swat 
where the research was focussed there is a gap (regrowth minus timbercuttings) of over 
300 000 m
3 for fuel wood alone (Shaheen et al., 2000). Historical accounts tell us that 
forests have always been an important source of income within the livelihood strategies 
of  local  population  (Barth,  1985;  Sultan-i-Rome,  2005).  Where  in  the  past  the  vast 
expanses  of  forests  could  support  these  demands,  high  levels  of  population  growth 
(doubling of the population every 15-20 years) coupled by deforestation have drastically 
altered the picture. Today, the local population faces ever decreasing forest stocks with 
increasing threats to both the local communities (land slides, erosion) and down stream 
beneficiaries of the watersheds as well as increasing threat to biodiversity. 
In a broader perspective, Angelsen and Wunder (2003) distinguish five dimensions in 
which poor people benefit from forests and forest products: the type of beneficiaries, 
types  of  forest  products  and  services  provided,  the  role  of  forest  benefits  within  the 
households  strategy  (subsistence  versus  commercial  use),  type  of  natural  resource 
management (ranging from pure natural forest extraction to (re)planted forests, and high 
or low return products. 
Management of forest resources, especially sustainable management thereof, seems to 
be suffering from severe shortcomings. In Pakistan the management of forest resources is 
generally considered the exclusive domain of the Forestry Department, especially since 
the state is the formal owner of all forest resources. However the actual situation reveals 
an amalgam of perceived property rights concerning the forest and its resources, and a 
situation where institutions are ill-defined.  
Traveling  through  Swat we  see lush  green  hills and  mountains  with  snow  capped 
peaks in the distance. The impression is of paradise. On second sight we notice that most 
of the lush green areas are not the virgin forests that once covered the hillsides in a not so 
distant past. There are only isolated spots of forest left. On the road there is a steady 
stream of trucks, pick-up trucks, donkeys and human beings transporting timber and fuel 
wood from the forests to the lower, more densely populated areas. 
A large land-owner living in the valley indicates that he has attempted to manage the 
forested areas of his land holding by devolving the management to a local community 
living there and paying them in forestry extraction rights, but to no avail, “the smugglers 
are stronger and the local communities are not dependable”. In one such community on 
the forest edge an impoverished villager indicates that for them it is cut trees or die. 
Forest  royalties  from  official  lumber  extraction  pass  them  by  60%  is  for  the  large 
landowners in  the  valley  and  40%  for  the  Forestry  Department.  Protecting  the  forest   3 
against local people is feasible but it is impossible to protect the forest from influential 
outsiders in collusion with the Forestry Department.  
The Forestry Department has the sole mandate for the management of the forests, 
which cannot be left to the local population as indicated by senior Forestry Department 
officials because they are the root cause of the deforestation. The Forestry Department is 
undergoing a reform process including the devolution of control to lower administrative 
levels. The problem is that the Forestry Department is under-funded and under-staffed. 
Donors have pulled out of the reform process after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
A donor representative on the other hand put forward that lack of real commitment to 
the reform process was the reason for the drying up of funds from the donor-community.  
NGOs indicate that the people’s perspective is lacking in forest affairs. A lawyer in Swat  
adds that the judiciary plays havoc in the process because there are no possibilities of 
redress and corruption is rampant. 
Devolution is fine, a manager of joint forestry management projects notes, but there 
are  political  fetters:  policy  and  practice  are  not  in  line.  A  Historian  adds  that  social 
institutions  have  eroded  since  the  accession  of  Swat  in  the  Pakistan  state  in  1969, 
“Finding no legal redress and no redress in social orders leads to illicit use of natural 
resources that has become so widespread that it is now the norm.” 
The  Forestry  Department  as  formal  managers  of  the  forest  resources  has  been 
undergoing a long reform process aimed at improving its performance. The effects of this 
reform process have not resulted in less deforestation. From the policy perspective this 
has  been  leading  to  stated  intentions  to  further  reform  the  Forestry  Department,  the 
question is whether organizational reform is the answer. We think there are more limiting 
bottlenecks to sustainable forest management in Pakistan.  
Our research question is therefore to determine the main bottlenecks to halting the 
current  deforestation  trends  in  North  West  Pakistan  taking  an institutional  economics 
perspective.  We  believe  that  such  a  perspective  sheds  valuable  insights  on  the 
mechanisms of resource degradation and provides a background for evaluating policies 
aimed at sustainable forest management. 
In this article we explore the mechanisms behind the deforestation and try to uncover 
mechanisms to reverse the process. Although our conclusions are not very optimistic, we 
provide  a  framework  for  determining  the  bottlenecks  in the  management of  common 
resources from the perspective of institutions. 
The  structure  of  the  article  is  as  follows  in  section  2  we  provide  the  theoretical 
background used in the analysis focusing on property rights, and the historical perspective 
and the issue of transaction costs. In section 3 we highlight the results of our analyses. 
These analyses are mostly based on qualitative research. The results are related to high 
transaction  costs,  corruption,  vested  interests  and  the  reform  process  in  the  Forest   4 
Department. Our results paint a very grim picture of the institutional settings surrounding 
the management of forest resources. Although the evidence is thin an mostly anecdotal 
there is some indication that there are possibilities for sustainable forest management 
despite  the  odds. This evidence is  also  provided  in  section  3.  In  our last  section  we 
provide some conclusions regarding the institutional aspects of forest management.  
 
2.  Methods and analysis 
2.1.  New Institutional theory of property rights 
In  discussions  on  environmental  degradation  the  issue  of  property  rights  plays  an 
important role. The central thesis is that inappropriate property rights regimes impede 
sustainable management of natural resources. A strong message from the seminal paper 
“The Tragedy of the Commons” by Hardin (1968) has echoed through the literature. The 
message that Common Pool Resources cannot be managed in a sustainable manner lead 
the push towards private or state ownership of resources. Actually what Hardin describes 
is not Common Property but lack of any property rights regime. This notion has become 
common understanding with the publication of seminal papers on this issue (Bromley, 
1991; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992; Von Benda-Beckmann, 2001). Following Von Benda-
Beckmann (2001) we distinguish between categorical and concretised rights. Categorical 
rights  are  “typified  legal  concepts  that  construct  a  general  relationship  of  rights  and 
options between categories of persons or groups with respect to categories of resources” 
(ibid,  p.  299).  Examples  are  constructs  such  as  ownership,  inheritance  rights.  In 
concretised rights we are dealing with the rights relationship of actual persons or groups 
and a resource. 
The  rules  that  define  property  rights  –requiring,  prohibiting  or  permitting  certain 
actions– are effective when they are generally recognised and respected by the other 
economic agents. The rules governing property rights can be divided into operational 
level, and collective choice. The former relates to the possibility to access and withdraw 
from  the  resource;  the  latter  relates  to  the  possibility  to  change  management  rules, 
exclusion rights and alienation rights (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992).  
We follow up on this discussion with a brief presentation of the idea of bundles of 
property rights adding onto this idea the notion of bundles of property duties. The concept 
of bundles of property rights has been very clearly addressed by Schlager and Ostrom 
(1992). In their paper they distinguish between five types of rights that are bundled in a 
property rights regime, namely: 
1. Access rights: the right to enter a defined physical property; 
2. Withdrawal rights: the right to obtain the “products” of a resource, both in terms of 
goods and (environmental) services;   5 
3. Management  rights:  the  right  to  regulate  the  internal  pattern  of  usage  and  the 
transformation of the resource; 
4. Exclusion rights: the right to determine who will and who will not have access, 
withdrawal  and  management  rights,  and  how  those  rights  can  and  cannot  be 
transferred; 
5. Alienation rights: the rights to sell, lease, give-away or bequeath any or all of the 
above. 
 The first two components are the basic operational level rights. The last one is what is 
often  seen  as  property  rights  in  a  very  narrow  sense.  In  the  case  of  common-pool 
resources the last three can be considered collective choice property rights. This way of 
presenting property rights has proven very powerful to disentangle the complexity of 
common  property  regimes.  Applying  this  theoretical  concept  to  forestry  resources 
provides us with the following picture in the case of North-West Pakistan. 
At the lowest level we have access rights, this means that a person or group is allowed 
physical access to a resource. The next right is the right of usufruct, implying the right to 
extract certain or all proceeds from the resource. Most forests can be accessed freely, but 
the right to withdraw products (timber and non-timber forestry products) is limited by 
statutory and customary law. We distinguish management rights from usufruct rights. 
Management rights relate to the long-term management of the resource itself not to the 
extraction of the proceeds. Often it is impossible to distinguish between the two, since 
extraction technology and land management practices are interwoven (even in terms of 
semantics). However, there are cases in which a third party has a say in the way the land 
is managed. At present the management of forests is the exclusive domain of the Forestry 
Department despite efforts over the past decade to devolve some of the management tasks 
to local communities. Exclusion rights refer to the possibility of determining who is and 
who isn’t allowed access, extraction rights and management rights. According to statutory 
law, the forests of Pakistan are State owned, hence exclusion and alienation rights are 
officially in the hands of the Forestry Department. As we will argue in the next section 
this  current  state  of  affairs  is  quite  different  from  the  historical  context  of  forestry 
management in North West Pakistan. 
In Northern Pakistan two sets of de jure institutions exist next to each other. The first 
is statutory law, the second customary law including the customary means of enforcement 
as is the case with Pukhtun Society (Barth, 1968) An important aspect of the relationship 
between property rights and the way the land resource is utilised is the time horizon of the 
property holders. The time horizon depends on the subjective time preference of the rights 
holders and on the perception of the duration of the rights at stake. We are now moving 
into the characterisation of the rights. The rights besides their content are characterised by 
duration and assurance. Duration of rights is the time horizon over which the rights are   6 
defined. This can be a finite period or an indefinite time-span. The assurance refers to the 
perception of how certain it is that the rights holder can ascertain those rights during the 
period over which the rights are defined.  
These property rights are embedded in institutions. The notion of institutions needs a 
little explanation. Since the central concept of this paper is institutions, and especially 
economic institutions, it is necessary to provide a clear definition of this concept at this 
point. Following North (Ahmed, 1980), we define institutions as the formal rules and 
informal constraints guiding human behaviour and the means to ensure adherence to these 
rules of the game, in order to reduce uncertainty in the transfer of goods and services 
between individuals and/or groups. Formal rules are usually defined as those rules laid 
down  statutory  law,  also  known  as  de  jure  institutions.  However  if  well  defined 
customary law exists including the customary means of enforcement as is the case with 
Pukhtun Society (Barth, 1968 ; Ahmed, 1980) this too should be considered as  de jure 
institutions. 
 In Northern Pakistan two sets of de jure institutions exist next to each other. The first is 
statutory law, the second customary law. To some extent the rules these two sets of 
institutions lay down complement each other, but more often they contradict each other. 
In the undefined space created by the competing de jure institutions, de facto property 
rights regimes embedded in informal institutions can exist. 
Informal  de  facto  institutions  also  entail  culturally  accepted  norms  and  modes  of 
behavior. The institutions themselves shape the process of updating the expectations with 
regard  to  the  rules  of  the  game  according  to  actual  experience.  Hence,  the  natural 
dynamics  of  institutions  is  a  slow  process  of  gradual  adaptation  to  changing 
circumstances. This process follows different speeds. Some institutional arrangements are 
deeply embedded in culture and tend to change only very slowly, while other evolve more 
quickly. 
The  common  hypothesis  is  that  institutions  matter  when  talking  about  poverty 
reduction and resource conservation (Barrett et al., 2006). If there is uncertainty or lack of 
information about property rights and the way they are enforced, this can give rise to 
conflicts over those resources that are detrimental for their conservation, (see for instance 
Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999; Haro et al. 2005; Amman and Duraiappah 2004; and 
Kabubo-Mariara 2004). The key issue is that it does not really matter which rules are 
adopted by a community or country, rather it does matters how well they are embedded 
and how well they are enforced (Barret et al., 2006). 
Following Williamson (2000) embeddedness refers to the spontaneous, noncalculative 
informal  institutions  anchored  in  customs,  traditions,  norms  and  religion.  These 
institutions  only  evolve  very  slowly.  Slightly  quicker  is  the  evolution  of  the  formal 
institutional environment. These are the formal rules of the game especially related to   7 
formal  property  rights  and  anchored  in  policy,  bureaucracy  and  the  judiciary  system. 
Whilst the institutional environment tends to remain stable over decades, the play of the 
game itself is prone to more rapid change. We are referring to the actual governance 
structures that shape the actual marginal conditions. These marginal conditions shape 
resource allocation and day-to-day management of common pool resources. 
Even when property rights are well defined, enforcement of the property rights may 
well entail substantial costs. These costs are part of a larger set of costs commonly known 
as  transaction  costs.  The  notion  that  transactions  are  costly  has  important  theoretical 
ramifications. It is a reasonable assumption that individuals or organizations have to use 
time and resources to secure information and have limited ability to process data and 
formulate appropriate action.  
From a theoretical point of view, the fact that decision-makers have neither perfect 
knowledge, nor foresight, and may make errors implies that they will always function 
inefficiently compared to the hypothetical decision-makers in mainstream neoclassical 
economic theory. 
A  transaction can  be  defined as  something  that  occurs  when  a  good  or  service  is 
transferred across a technologically separable interface. One stage of activity ends and 
another  begins  (Williamson,  1985).  Transaction costs  entail  the  transfer  of  resources, 
either physically or legally.  
In  the  enforcement  of  property  rights,  transaction  costs  play  an  important  role. 
Successful institutions can be characterized as those institutions where on the one hand 
the rules and regulations are strongly embedded in the mind-set of the stakeholders in 
order to keep the transaction costs linked to the enforcement to a minimum, while on the 
other hand the institution offers a locally optimal solution to complex coordination issues 
that  without the institution  would lead  to  insurmountable transaction costs  in  various 
fields. 
The  rules  and  regulations  governing  the  interactions  between  individuals  and  /  or 
groups  where  it  concerns  property  are  usually  presented  in  terms  of  property  rights. 
However besides the notion of rights there are also obligations or duties concerning the 
property. These duties can be placed along side the rights as the flip side of a coin. The 
main difference however is that obligations are related primarily to the level above the 
basic operational level. 
This implies that we can now also distinguish the following duties: 
1. Management duties: the obligation to regulate the internal pattern of usage and / or 
the transformation of the resource in such a way that certain preconditions are 
met, including basic notions about sustainability; 
2. Exclusion  duties:  the  obligation  to  exclude  or  grant  rights  to  certain  groups  or 
individuals under certain circumstances;   8 
3. Alienation duties: the obligation to pass on any of the other rights and / or duties to 
another party under certain circumstances. 
 
So we have only marginally into consideration that rights and may not be in hands of a 
single stakeholder. Obviously with common pool resources, those exploiting the resource 
are often individuals or households, while those managing the resource are communities. 
In principal each right and / or duty can be attributed to one or more stakeholders. If there 
are more stakeholders, there are grounds for conflict. If there is conflict there is a need for 
means to mediate in the conflict, either in a formal (courts) or informal (village councils) 
sense. 
There is another issue that plays an important role when more than one stakeholder is 
concerned. This is the issue of monitoring and control. A stakeholder may have certain 
rights and obligations vis à vis other stakeholders, but if there are but limited possibilities 
to have checks and balances in place the rights and obligations will have little meaning. 
Extraction rights may be limited to a few selected stakeholders, but if there is no control 
possible over “illegal” extraction, those extraction rights are of limited value especially if 
rights are combined with restricting obligations that do not hold for those who extract 
outside the framework of the property rights regime. 
An important concept in relation to monitoring and control is that of transaction costs. 
The transaction costs are the costs that have to be incurred to effectuate the monitoring 
and control of the property rights regime. Very often failure of property rights regimes to 
deliver the desired results regarding common pool resources can be attributed to high 
transaction costs for monitoring and control when many stakeholders exist. 
Transaction  costs  are  very  important  in  understanding  institutional  aspects  of 
economic behavior (Furubotn and Richter, 1997) since it relates not only to the issues of 
monitoring and control, but also to the cost of information in general. When property 
rights regimes are unclear, the costs of action and inaction can be very great. 
Especially when poor households in affected rural communities depend critically on 
the natural resources for their livelihoods, well-defined rules and regulations governing 
the use of those natural resources, whether de facto or de jure, are indispensable. This is a 
necessary but not sufficient precondition as we have just argued. It is also important to 
have the means to enforce the rights and obligations related to the property rights regime 
and  to  have  a  system  for  monitoring  and  control  with  transaction  costs  that  are  not 
prohibitive. 
Following the notions put forward by Williamson, we argue that lower transaction 
costs  in  complex  settings  are  associated  with  well-embedded  institutions.  Well- 
embedded institutions imply that stakeholders will be less willing to infract the rules, and   9 
other stakeholders will be more willing to monitor and control the adherence to the rules. 
Strong customary law can be very instrumental. 
 
 
2.2.  History of Swat  
 
History matters for entitlements because it is at the root of the status quo and, as such, it 
shapes expectations (claims and rights). The history of Swat has a bearing on current land 
tenure  and  forest  management.  Historical  developments  are  at the  origin  of  the  right 
holding of heirs of the most important families allied to the local dictator. In this section 
we will outline the historical evolution leading to the modern management regime.  
Swat  has  a  distinct  history  in  relation to  Pakistan  and  the  rest  of  the  Indian  sub-
continent. While the rest of the area was colonised by the British crown, Swat succeeded 
in conserving its autonomy and, once Pakistan became independent in 1947, it did not 
fully access Pakistan until 1969.
1  
 
2.2.1 Pre accession 
The earlier history of Swat (from the end of the 19
th century) was marked by the 
emergence of a political structure centred on an autocrat. The dictator, called Wali, was 
leading a rebellious country and needed the support of allies from the powerful families 
of Swat in order to defend the Princely State of Swat (as the state was officially called 
before the accession to Pakistan). Challenges to the state came from external powers (the 
British and the neighbouring Kalam state) and from internal ones (other local leaders 
trying  to  seize  power)  (Sultan-i-Rome,  2005).  As  a  result,  the  rulers  were  under 
continuous threat and built alliances with wealthy local lords. 
The  history  of  the  Wali is  especially  important  for  the management  of  the  forest, 
because natural resources were valuable assets used for building and keeping alliances, 
thus their exploitation was crucial to the survival of the regime. The management system 
compounded  harsh  punishments  to  those  who  illegally  encroached  the  forest,  while 
allowing favoritism and smuggling to the Wali’s –and his allies’– benefit. The decision 
power, with respect to logging and forest exploitation, was centralised and rested in the 
hands of the Wali.
 2 
 
                                                 
1 For an account of Swat’s resistance to outsiders occupation and interference see Lindholm, 1990. 
2 For a detailed historical account of the autocratic rule of the Wali of Swat, the strictness of the 
application of the law to the commoners, the importance that forestry had under his rule, and the illegal 
cutting and favours for his allies (the Khans) see Sultan-i-Rome, 2005. For an altogether different 
version of the Wali’s rule see his autobiography (Barth, 1985).   10 
2.2.2 Post accession 
The accession to Pakistan of the Princely State of Swat, brought a breakdown of the 
existing  institutional  setting:  the  national  state,  formally,  took  under  its  control  the 
management  and  exploitation  of  forests.  The  law  provided  only  for  a  minute 
disbursement of royalties (10% of the total net revenues) to be paid to the legal right 
holders  and  established  some  extraction  rights  for  local  communities  (to  meet 
consumption needs of the residents).  
Pakistani state’s management, from the moment it took over the forest sector in Swat, 
was characterized by a command and control approach whose effective enforcement was 
beyond state’s capability.
3 The post accession regime implied that most of the forests 
were declared reserved or protected, i.e. the management regimes strictly  constrained 
exploitation rights.
4 In both systems property and management rested in the hands of the 
state, through the Forest Department, but locals and former owners’ rights are different 
under  the  two  management  regimes.  In  the  reserve  forest,  no  cutting  is  allowed  and 
members of the local community have limited rights for extracting dry wood and non 
timber forest products. In protected forest, the Forest Department is in charge of the 
management  plan  and  at  times  when  there  are  cuttings,  the  forest  development 
corporation  is  in  charge of  the  cutting  of  marked  timber  and  shares  of  the  net  sales 
revenues are given to right holders (Steimann, 2004). Moreover, the “local quota” of 
timber is reserved to local residents for their needs and there is an “emergency quota” that 
can be used under special circumstances (e.g. to rebuild a house after a fire).
 5  
The shares of revenues from wood sales directed to right holders have been increasing 
over time, from 10% at the time of accession, to 60% nowadays. Those entitled to shares 
of the royalties of the forest are the land owners (mostly Khans families–the former allies 
of the Wali) that reside far away from the forest, or local communities, depending on the 
property situation of the forest at the time it was taken over by the state.
6 The incapability 
of the state to implement its policies, together with the dismantlement of the previous 
regime of property rights, gave rise to an open access regime. 
Additionally, the gap between de jure and de facto management of the forest created 
multiple bases for claiming rights on the forest: the statutory law, custom, and the de 
                                                 
3 Pakistan was not the only state that tried to control the forest sector without the necessary resources to 
implement its own rules on the face of high transaction costs. For comparison see Ostrom (1990) on 
Nepal. 
4 A third category of forests are the guzara forests. They are those whose property was left to the 
communities,  even  though  relevant  management  responsibilities  were  taken  over  by  the  Forest 
Department. Guzara forest is an institutional setup that characterized almost no forest in our study area. 
5 For a detailed description of legal status and management provisions in the forest of the whole of the 
North West Frontier Province see Steimann, 2004. 
6 Property rights over the forest are contested and contention over property rights is a source of endless 
litigations that are dealt by Pakistan’s corrupt and inefficient judiciary system.   11 
facto regime. In such a situation, some agents chose to refer to competing legal structures 
to justify their claims according to their interests and other agents preferred to operate 
altogether outside of the legal framework (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002).  
The open access regime on the forest implied that land owners and local residents 
were  exploiting  the  forest  restrained  only  by  local  power  relations.  Since  the  Forest 
Department  started  operations  in  Swat  (along  with  the  rest  of  the  Pakistani  public 
administration), the gap between the regulatory framework and the actual management 
practices was not bridged. Encroachments and illegal cuttings continued. Furthermore, 
legal disputes over the cuttings’ royalties began and court decisions settling them were 
long awaited (at times for decades), and, in many cases, court decisions are still pending. 
With  respect  to  the  Forest  Department,  we  collected  information  through  focused 
group discussions and interviews during the fieldwork. It appeared that corruption widely 
affects  all  the  operations  of  the  Forest  Department  and  of  the  Forest  Development 
Corporation (who is charge of exploitative operations). Forest guards are paid salaries 
cannot satisfy the needs of families (Steimann, 2004) and they are lacking the support of 
the  other  enforcement  agencies  (which  are  themselves  inefficient  and  plagued  by 
corruption). The overall enforcement system seems more geared to make ends meet for 
forest officials, rather than protect the forest. Also, the manning of numerous check-posts 
along the roads going down the Swat Valley, serve little purpose apart from extracting 
bribes in exchange for turning a blind eye on timber smugglers.
7 
 
2.3.  Transaction costs 
Management and controlled extraction of products from natural resources not only 
requires  clearly  defined  property  rights  but  also  some  system  for  monitoring  and 
evaluation of the state of the resource.  
Within institutional economics measuring these indicators is classified under the term 
transaction costs. In short, transaction costs include contact, contract & control (North, 
1990, p28-33). 
This entails the cost of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being managed. 
This may be difficult, because of asymmetric information: resource managers on one side 
of the market have much better information than those on the other side.  Moreover there 
are the costs of policing and enforcing agreements. Enforcement poses no problems when 
it is in the interests of the other party to live up to agreements. But without institutional 
constraints,  self-interested  behaviour  will  exclude  complex  exchange  because  of  the 
uncertainty  that  the  other  party  will  find  it  in  his  or  her  interest  to  live  up  to  the 
                                                 
7 This was confirmed by numerous interviews and by our own witnessing the ease of movement of 
truckloads of illegal logs in thorough the valley.   12 
agreement.  This  problem  is  particularly  relevant  for  agreements  in  which  there  are 
conflicting interests. Policing and enforcing agreements (or rules, laws etc) may involve 
substantial costs. 
 
3.  Forest Management in Swat 
 
The present situation in Swat can be seen as the result of historic processes described 
above. While the overall goal of the Forest Department and the local communities may 
not differ that much: sustainable management of the forest resources to ensure a stable 
stream  of  revenues  and  services,  the  outcome  of  the  strategic  actions  of  the  actual 
stakeholders is quite the opposite. 
Let us start by disentangling the different stakeholders to then relate them to the 
different aspects of the current property rights regimes. The main stakeholders are as can 
be gathered from the historic perspective described above: the Forestry Department, the 
local communities on the fringe of the forest, large land owners who are not themselves 
part of the afore mentioned local communities, besides these main stakeholders there are 
also those who have a vested interest in a steady supply of timber from the forests of 
NWFP, often referred to as the Timber Mafia.  
Extraction  rights  and  obligations  related  to  those  rights  are  handled  somewhat 
differently  under  statutory  and  customary  law.  Under  statutory  law,  the  Forest 
Department is the sole entity with extraction and management rights related to timber. 
The ban on logging that has been in effect over the past decade or so, implies a very 
strong  restriction  on  extraction.  Extraction  rights  are  limited  to  local  needs  for 
construction  and  firewood  purposes.  The  Forestry  Department  has  the  duty  to  pay 
royalties to the rightful stakeholders in the forest.  
Under customary law, the owner of the forest has the disposal of the extraction 
rights. He can lease out those rights to individual loggers. Under the rule of the Wali, 
commercial logging did not take place on a large scale, and extraction was mainly for 
domestic purposes. There was no royalty system. 
Over  time  overall land  tenure  systems  have  changed.  The  traditional  system  of 
rotating land ownership amongst large land owners with whole communities as tenants 
has  given  way  to  a  mixed  system  of  large  landholdings  alongside  small  holdings  of 
individuals  and  communities.  With  the  mixed  system  regarding  agricultural  land  an 
unclear situation regarding rights to forestry royalties has arisen. It is unclear to which 
owners of agricultural land, certain forestry lots are related.  
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3.1.  High transaction costs of sustainable forestry 
Management of the forest resources used to be the domain of the local land owners 
or their tenants. With state ownership of forest resources, management is the exclusive 
domain of the Forestry Department. However monitoring and control of the forests and 
the  activities  therein  is  costly  and  hence  transgression  of  formal  rules  is  usually  not 
punished. 
What we need to keep in mind is that there are a number of conflicting goals and 
aspirations  of  different  stakeholders  vis-à-vis  the  natural  resource  base.  Where  local 
communities will often regard the forest as a source of revenues especially in the absence 
of  other  sources  of  income,  the  state  will  often  have  a  more  general  perspective  by 
viewing the forest as a continuing source of ecological service provision, in terms of 
biodiversity, watershed management, etc. The benefits of these ecological services do not 
accrue to the local communities but to beneficiaries elsewhere. Sustainable management 
of forest resources implies that the conflicting goals are somehow resolved. 
In order to ensure sustainable management of natural resources a number of criteria 
have to be met that are not met in NWFP. The first is clear property rights, especially in 
relation to the management of the forest resources. The second is the realisation that the 
management costs and the benefits of the ecological services are not linked to the same 
stakeholders. Some sort of compensation mechanism should be in place if non-benefiting 
stakeholders are supposed to provide management inputs, see the growing literature on 
Payments  for  Environmental  Services.  If  management  of  the  forest  resources  is  not 
effectuated  through  working  economic  instruments,  the  alternative  is  a  system  of 
command and control. This entails the definition of clear indicators for management and a 
costly system of monitoring. These costs are generally considered transaction costs of the 
management scheme. Even under systems of communal management (with and without 
outside payment) there are costly systems of monitoring necessary to ensure that the flow 
of ecological services is safeguarded.  
People facing moderate, credible environmental threats are more likely to be willing 
manage the forest resources in a sustainable manner than those who do not face those 
threats  but  just  exercise  those  threats.  This  former  group  may  need  small  economic 
incentives to get involved in sustainable forest management, more so than those living in 
relative harmony with nature. Although paying the latter may be perceived as ‘fair’, it 
does not create additional ecological service provision. The transaction costs involved in 
ensuring sustainable forest management increase with the decrease in felt environmental 
threats.  
Transaction costs for monitoring sustainable forest management also increase with 
disarticulated organisational structures. If the organisational structures at local level are 
not recognized by formal authorities or not taken seriously, it becomes difficult to set up a   14 
system of joint monitoring. Trust is an important element in transactions. With unclear 
property rights the level of distrust between various stakeholders tends to be high. 
    
 
3.2.  Corruption 
 
Corruption plays an important role in illegal logging operations that take place across 
Swat. The enforcement agencies (first of all, the Forest Department) whose official goal 
is protecting the forest have in many occasions turned into the main culprits. In practice, 
the main purpose of many agents that are supposed to watch over the management and 
protection of the forest is to gain the maximum personal advantage from the power that 
they hold. The extraction of personal gains through the exercise of public power is the 
very definition of corruption (Transparency International, 2004) and in the enforcement 
agencies  of  Swat  it  takes  the  shape  of  bribe  extraction.  Inducements  are  disbursed 
throughout the illegal logging process: when logs are fell, and when they are transported.
8  
Forest guards patrolling the forest are generally ready to demand a bribe for turning a 
blind eye on illegal activities.
9 When agreement on illegal payments cannot be made, 
possibly  because  of  some  incorruptible  employees  of  the  Forest  Department, 
confrontations  among  smugglers  and  forest  guards  can  escalate  into  violence.
10 
Furthermore,  forest officials  artificially  create  occasions  for  bribes extraction  because 
they create bureaucratic obstacles to members of the local community who have a right to 
extract  wood  for  self-consumption  (e.g.  they  delay  the  issue  of  extraction  permits). 
Indeed, some of the most common complaint of locals is that they are harassed when they 
exercise their rights and when villagers are been involved in participatory projects they 
required changes to the procedure for emitting logging permits (Suleri, 2002). 
Corruption and the related enforcement problem in the forestry sector are well known 
across the country and are often reported by the press.
11 Reform attempts do recognise the 
                                                 
8 Information on corruption and forestry has been accumulated during the fieldwork. The source of 
such information is, in most of the cases, are group interviews with members of the local communities, 
with students of history, lawyers, and employees of the Forest Department (of different ranks). 
9 The situation of bribes extraction is not as clear-cut as it could seem at first. Forest guards themselves 
are not aware of the rules that should be applied if someone is caught breaching the law. In such a 
confused situation the difference between a bribe and a fine (whose proceeds are used to complement a 
meagre salary) becomes blurred. Steimann (Steimann, 2004) illustrates different perceptions -within 
the Forest Department- of the de jure management regime with respect to enforcement. 
10 Honest forest officials are reported to be the victims of violence, but given the fact that there are 
discordant  reports  it  is  difficult  to  say  a  final  word  on  who  the  victim  or  the  assailant  in  these 
confrontations. 
11  For  a  few  examples  see  October  17,  2003  of  Dawn  (internet  edition)  at 
www.dawn.com/2003/10/17/nat28.htm.   15 
shortcoming of the present management regime and suggest changes to the enforcement 
mechanisms. These reform attempts are often focused on increasing the likelihood of 
catching  those  involved  in  illegal  activities  and  increasing  the  penalties  (‘crime  and 
punishment’  approach),  or  require  radical  reforms  at  the  state  level.  The  crime  and 
punishment  approach  focuses  on  the  improving  the  enforcement  of  existing  legal 
arrangements. The problem with this approach is that it requires that the control agencies 
are not corrupt, while in Pakistan the judiciary and the police (that is those who should 
coerce forest official to respect the law and resist the temptation of colluding with illegal 
loggers) are very corrupted agencies themselves (Transparency International, 2002). Thus 
the controller cannot be relied upon. National reforms such as the ones that are requested 
by international NGOs that focus on fighting corruption, require major changes in the 
institutional  framework  and  meet  the  opposition  of  powerful  vested  interests.  The 
transition away from a status where corruption is so pervasive need to be embedded in 
other interests in order to be successful and the use of textbook rules for achieving such 
transition is commonly resulting in a failure (Johnston, 2005). This is witnessed by the 
fact that only seldom countries do manage to sensibly decrease the amount of corruption 
they are affected in a short period of time (Kaufmann, Kraay et al., 2005). While radical 
reforms  like  introducing  guarantees  for  free  mass-medias,  democratising  the  political 
process,  encourage  citizens  scrutiny  of  politicians  are  initiatives  that  deserve 
encouragement  and  are  valuable  objectives  (per  se,  beyond  their  implications  for 
corruption),  their  achievement  in  the  short  run  seems  unlikely  and  improving 
management in the forestry sector cannot wait for ideal conditions. 
Moreover the successful enforcement of existing property rights, even if possible, 
would run the risk of cementing historical injustices: above we highlighted the origins of 
skewed  rights  distribution  towards  large  land  owners.  Historical  developments  with 
respect  to  land  holdings  are  still  determining  skewed  land  distribution  since  land 
reforms’ implementation failed (see Naqvi, Khan et al., 1987 and Social Policy and 
Development Centre (SPDC), 2001). The effective enforcement of rules based on existing 
rights would deprive members of the local communities of large shares of their income 
and, ultimately, of their necessary means of survival.
12  
Finally, reforms that focus on enforcement end up giving increasing power to forest 
officials.  When  confronted  with  opportunities  to  extract  bribes,  these  officials  are 
predictably going to use their powers to increase their share of rents. Forest officials 
would find that the easiest way to extract rents is using their increased powers against 
                                                 
12 The poor, especially those living in the more marginal areas, depend on resources that would not be 
available  to  them  if  the  law  would  be  successfully  enforced(Rafi  Khan,  Yusuf  et  al.,  2006).  In 
particular, such decrease on the availability of resources would be problematic if –as it seems most 
probable- the interpretation of the law and the resolution of disputes on property rights would be biased 
in favour of large land owners.   16 
those agents that are not in the condition to resist. As a result the most corrupt members 
of the Forest Department are most likely going to increase their revenues at the expense 
of villagers who are in trouble with meeting their own basic needs. 
 
3.3.  Vested interests 
 
Economic agents coordinate themselves in order to take advantage of profit opportunities 
offered  by  the  existing  institutional  setting.  Over  time,  the  selection  of  successful 
organizations will create wealthy interests who have a stake in the same institutions that 
allowed  them  to  operate  and  enrich  (North,  1990).  In  the  forest  sector  of  Swat  the 
opportunities offered by the open access situation, following the breakdown of earlier 
institutions that characterised accession to Pakistan, were seized by a constellation of 
economic agents and gave raise to a new de facto institutional setting. Those who have 
gained the most from these institutions have large stakes in the status quo and have the 
resources to defend these interests. In this section we will identify the stakeholders in the 
management of forests in Swat and highlight the vested interests that need to be tackled in 
order to achieve institutional reform.  
The  main  actors,  with  stakes  in  the  forestry  sector,  are:  federal  and  provincial 
governments,  the  Forest  Department,  the  forest  development  corporation,  local 
communities (differentiated among themselves mostly because of right-holding issues), 
NGOs,  and  international  donors  who  all  have  some  qualified  interest  in  forest 
conservation.  Additionally,  there  are  the  interests  involved  in  illegal  logging  for 
commercial purposes (the timber mafia), since the forest has been put under such strain 
by over-extraction that in the medium run only logging for local consumption would be 
possible. These agents -thanks to corruption- are able to unduly influence some of the 
other actors.  
The vested interests that will resist most changes from the current situation are those 
that  profit  from  illegal  logging.  These  include  the  smugglers,  the  wood  processing 
industry, and the economic agents involved in activities induced by timber trade. All of 
these  actors  depend  -to  a  different  degree-  on  the  continuation  of  unsustainable  logs 
extraction.  
The  Forest  Department,  though  not  in  its  entirety,  is  among  the  vested  interests 
opposed to change. The current regime is giving to the Forest Department demanding 
tasks (beyond feasible reach), but also granting it political and economic power. Some 
members of the Forest Department, at different levels from the top to the ground, have 
become  accustomed  to  receiving  bribes  to  complement  their  meagre  salaries.  These 
illegal disbursement are dependent on the power that the department can wield. Apart 
from  the  economic  incentives  related  to  bribes  it  also  appears  that  the  Department   17 
developed its own routines and it is unwilling to give up part of its responsibilities even 
though it lacks the resources to fulfil the tasks related to them.
13  
The provincial government is the recipient of 40% of royalties on commercial logging 
and,  more  importantly,  members  of  it  are  also  collecting  bribes  in  relation  to  illegal 
extraction, or are linked to the illegal logging industry. The reluctance of the provincial 
government to give away the power on and part of the revenues from the forestry sector 
were  –as  we  will  see-  some  of  the  main  reasons  for  the  failure  of  previous  reform 
attempts aiming at introducing participatory forestry in Swat.  
The current institutional regime is embedded in these interests and successful reform 
can be achieved only when the reform process will be equally embedded in a coalition of 
potential winners. Furthermore, once institutional change is in order, the resistance to 
change of vested interests can be diluted by external resources. Such resources could be 
used for creating a win-win solution for insiders. 
 
3.4.  Reform attempts: from the Forest Sector Policy initiative to 
the latest developments 
The unsustainability of de facto management practices and the environmental, social, and 
economic shortcomings of current deforestation rates in most of the NWFP is apparent 
and some steps have been undertaken in order to reform the forestry sector. For the Swat 
district the most relevant reform effort was the Forest Sector Strategy, whose incept was 
supported by a loan of the Asian Development Bank and by technical assistance to the 
program provided by the Dutch Royal Embassy.  
The main task of this donor-driven program was to move the management of the forest 
from a state of command and control (and the related coercive practices and the social 
outcome thereof) towards co-management. In the intentions of the donors, the reform 
would have strengthened the local capabilities and the emphasis of the operations of the 
Forest  Department,  with  respect  to  local  communities,  would  have  moved  from 
punishment towards partnership. 
The  process  is  characterized  by  contradicting  steps.  On  the  one  hand,  local 
committees
14  have  been  established  in  several  villages,  so  that  they  could  be  an 
interlocutor of the Forest Department and, most importantly, contribute to the village land 
use plan. On the other hand, the process seems to have been controlled at the local level 
by the most influential members of the community (so that the committees over-represent 
the wealthy) and the Forest Department has been unwilling to give up part of its powers 
                                                 
13  The  widespread  of  this  attitude  was  confirmed  by  more  progressive  members  of  the  Forest 
Department in several meetings. 
14  The  committees  are  the  Village  Development  Committee  (composed  by  men)  and  the  Women 
Organization (composed by women).    18 
and  enter  in  a  real  partnership  with  the  locals.  Eventually,  due  to  implementation 
slowness and especially because of the resistance at the provincial level to undertake the 
necessary steps to support the reform in due time, the support of donor agencies have 
been withdrawn in 2004. This was a mayor setback, especially in the few places where 
the  reform  started  to  yield  benefits  (see  Suleri,  2002).  Now  trust  in  this  type  of 
interventions  is  lost  and  it  will  be  even  more  difficult  for  new  projects  to  build 
confidence. 
The Forest Ordinance of 2002 confirmed that the reform process was proceeding in 
contradicting ways. The incept of the ordinance was admirable -geared towards setting 
co-management  and  partnership  in  a  stable  regulatory  framework-,  but  under  the 
insistence of more conservative powers in the Forest Department the final result was only 
a compromise. Even Sungi, a Pakistani grass root NGO working for the empowerment of 
the most marginal members of the society, which from the beginning was supportive of 
the reform process, eventually rejected the Forest Ordinance. Of special importance in 
determining Sungi’s stance were the punitive powers that the ordinance gave to the Forest 
Department and that can be used against local communities. 
Since the donors’ support to the reform process was stopped, the whole process halted. 
The latest development were, if needed, and additional proof of the resistance that there 
was to the reform process. The latest initiatives are towards the strengthening of the 
Forest Department control of the forest and -in accordance to the 2002 Forest Ordinance- 
the forest force has been instituted.
15 Now a 500 men-strong armed force will patrol the 
forest of the North West Frontier Province. The Forest Department itself estimates that at 
least 3000 would be required in order to patrol effectively the forest of the province.
16 It 
appears that the insufficient number of men involved in the force will be in the future an 
excuse for another failure of the ‘crime and punishment’ approach. 
It is also worth noting that if the existing force would be effective much less than 500 
armed men would be necessary in order to control extraction activities in the area. Few 
roads run along the valley and functioning check-posts should be sufficient to stop a large 
part  of  the  smuggling.  If  the  guards  manning  the  check  posts  are  colluding  with  the 
smugglers, is arming the very same guards going to help to halt deforestation? Is having 
armed guards patrolling the forest, even more removed from detection possibility, going 
to stop illegal cuttings? Such questions should be addressed if the resources devoted to 
the reform process have to produce the intended environmental, economic and social 
dividend. 
 
                                                 
15 See http://www.ttjonline.com/story.asp?sc=35057, retrieved on the 01/08/2005.  
16 The expected cost of equipping such a force would be of 60m Pakistani Rupees (or around 825,000 
euros). See http://www.dawn.com/2004/06/16/local23.htm   19 
3.5.  Virtuous examples of forest management  
 
So  far  we  have  depicted  a  very  grim  image  of  the  forestry  sector  of  North  West 
Pakistan with rampant deforestation due to unclear property rights and obligations and 
very  few  means  to  enforce  them.  However  there  are  a  few  isolated  examples  of 
initiatives  that  rein  in  deforestation.  These  examples  do  shed  a  light  on  the  way 
property rights regimes at a local level can be used for sustainable forest management. 
Local groups of citizens at various times have been organizing themselves in 
order to defend some stretches of forest from exploitation. The most effective way 
that has been found to enforce extraction restrictions was with limits on the transport 
of logs: community-manned check posts have been set-up and timber loads have been 
blocked along the roads (Killeen and Khan, 2001; Rafi Khan, Bokhari et al., 2004). 
These check posts are operated independently from the Forestry department’s check 
posts (Rafi Khan, Bokhari et al., 2005) which is a clear indication of the level of 
mistrust between local communities and the state organisations.  
Other efforts to protect the forest involved local communities in concert with the forest 
department. The ones that were initiated under the donor-sponsored initiatives include 
community manned check posts, patrols from the local community guarding the forests, 
join patrols of community and forest department members and have been associated with 
improvements in forest cover (Steimann, 2004; Suleri, 2002). 
In  NWFP  a  forest  sector  reform  was  initiated  with  the  help  of  the  Asian 
Development Bank and bilateral foreign donors (mainly the Dutch). As part of this 
initiative people belonging to the forested areas of NWFP set up a platform, named 
Sarhad Awami Forestry Ittehad (SAFI) to raise their voice to make the process of 
reforms more democratic, transparent and people friendly. Although there is a voiced 
opposition to the way the forestry reform is progressing which is not promising for 
joint management by state and local communities, there is at least the beginning of 
focussed organisation (SAFI, 2002). 
Donor funded pilot projects of community managed forests in neighbouring Dir 
District, were quite promising for a while but have encountered severe difficulties 
after funding stopped. Joint forest management seems to have scope for success but 
depends  critically  on  the  willingness  to  endorse  such  a  process  by  the  Forestry 
Department (Sungi, 1996). 
 
 
4.  Conclusions  
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Institutional change is costly. Let us examine two types of institutional change. The 
first  type  is  institutional  change  that  originates  from  within  the  confines  of  the 
stakeholder group that adheres to the original institutional arrangement. The second is 
institutional  change  that  is  enforced  on  stakeholders  by  an  “overlord”.  Obviously 
actual institutional change takes place on a spectrum between the two extremes. 
Institutional  change  that  originates  from  within  can  be  characterized  as  an 
adaptation  to  changing  circumstances.  The  changing  circumstances  can  be 
autonomous processes, such as population growth (demographic pressure), integration 
into the outside world (market access), changes in the resource base (agro-ecological 
potential)  and  the  knowledge  base  (technological  innovation).  If  the  change  in 
circumstances  facing  the  decision-makers  is  gradual,  then  institutions  can  evolve 
alongside  in  order  to  deal  with  the  new  situations.  Information  is  costly;  hence 
institutional change from within reflects the trial-and-error adaptation and may well 
not coincide with the theoretically most efficient solution. However, institutions that 
evolve from within tend to be robust. 
Costs  associated  with  collective  action  tend  to  be  lower  if  groups  are  small 
(Olson, 1965) and homogenous (Baland and Platteau, 1997; 1998). This implies that 
small  special  interest  groups  have  disproportionate  power  compared  to  large 
amorphous groups.  
Institutional  change  that  originates  from  outside  the  original  stakeholder 
confines,  may  depart  from  traditional  rules  in  order  to  address  issues  that  local 
institutions  cannot  deal  with  because  the  changing  outside  circumstances  have 
become  too  overwhelming.  The  solutions  offered  by  this  exogenous  institutional 
change may be theoretically more efficient (especially in the long-run), however the 
institutions are less (or even not) embedded in the local communities, which implies 
that the enforcement costs of the institutional arrangements can become very high. 
When  the  institutional  arrangements  are  not  firmly  embedded  in  the  local 
community the principal stakeholder implementing the institutional arrangements is 
faced with a series of managerial and political transaction costs. These include costs 
for setting up, maintaining or changing the organizational design; costs (information, 
physical transfer) of running the organization; the costs of running the polity. 
In  summary  we  can  say  that  in  circumstances  where  institutional  change  is 
necessary we are faced with a trade-off between the transaction costs related to the 
enforcement  of  “improved”  institutional  arrangements  and  the  transaction  costs 
improving  enforceable  institutional  arrangements.  Incurring  these  transaction  costs 
only makes sense if the benefits from improved institutional arrangements outweigh 
the transition costs.   21 
When we relate this dilemma to the management regime of the forest in Swat, 
we identify at the one end of the spectrum the ideal forest management system; at the 
other  end  we  see  the  spontaneous  evolution  of  self  organization.  Different 
stakeholders in Swat have their own ideal management system to put forward. This is 
private property rights for the local large landowners. Alternatively, state ownership 
(effectively enforced by the Forest eDpartment) can be identified as the goal of the 
government, and by the Forest Department. The management by local communities 
(guaranteeing socially and environmentally sustainable outcomes) as common pool 
resources is identified by the local communities characterised by higher level of trust 
and most NGOs and donors.
17 Obviously the division of ideal management regimes 
will not relate so clearly to each class of actors; most notably the most progressive 
elements of the Forest Department will also identify community based management 
as an ideal. The current situation is an in between with an incoherent set of external 
interventions and strategic reactions by different agents in the local communities. The 
emergent system of management is the one producing the present dismal outcome. 
The role of donors and external interventions, in order to be effective, should not 
go on the opposite direction with respect to embedded evolutionary processes. The 
role of these interventions could be complementary to local process and contribute to 
guarantee that their evolution will respect social and environmental objectives. In this 
perspective, external actors could provide the additional founds so to orient locally 
evolved  institutional  change  can  produce  desired  outcomes  (low  transaction  costs, 
equity  and  sustainable  management  of  the  natural  resource  base)  and  providing 
incentives so that no spoilers’ coalition arises in order to stop the process. In this 
framework, external agencies would be directing some of the final goals, but leaving 
the organizational issues to local actors who can behave according to their preferential 
knowledge and produce locally embedded institutional change. 
Joint forest management seems to have possibilities given the scattered positive 
signals highlighted earlier. However we argue that the preconditions in terms of well-
defined  institutional  arrangements  regarding  property  rights,  control  and  financial 
remuneration for management activities should be addressed prior to embracing any 
scheme that is considered some sort of silver-bullet.    
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